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Abstract
Primary-Backup service replication does not constrain
that the service be built as a deterministic state machine.
It is meant to tolerate crashes, not intrusions. We con-
sider an approach, called FORTRESS, for adding intrusion-
resilience capability to a primary-backup server system.
It involves using proxies that block clients from directly
accessing servers, and periodically randomizing the ex-
ecutables of proxies and servers. We argue that prox-
ies and proactive randomization can offer sound defense
against attacks including de-randomization attacks. Us-
ing simulations, we then compare the attack resilience that
FORTRESS adds to a primary-backup server system with
that attainable through state machine replication (SMR)
that is fit only for deterministic services. A significant obser-
vation is that FORTRESS emerges to be more resilient than
an SMR system of four server replicas that are diversely
randomized at the start and are subject to proactive recov-
ery throughout.
1 Introduction
The most commonly suggested method for achieving in-
trusion tolerance is State Machine Replication (SMR). It
however requires that the system to be protected execute
as a deterministic state machine (DSM). This in turn re-
quires that all sources of non-determinism be identified and
resolved. This can be a difficult task in practice as these
sources can often be present at several levels, such as, ap-
plication, programming, middleware and OS levels. Identi-
fying and handling every source of nondeterminism at each
level can extract a considerable amount of overhead.
Classical primary-backup replication, PB for short, is
most widely used for maintaining service availability de-
spite crashes. Here, one replica, called the primary, does
processing and provides state updates to other replicas that
act as backups. PB is thus suited to replicating any service
without having to deal with sources of non-determinism.
On the other hand, it cannot tolerate intrusions.
This led us to examine, in [7], whether a PB system could
be made intrusion-resilient without losing its ability to repli-
cate an arbitrary service. More precisely, we explored the
possibility of attaining intrusion tolerance without having
to comply with the SMR requirement. In [7], we identi-
fied an approach, termed as FORTRESS, that can augment
intrusion-resilience to any server system. In particular, the
latter may not even be replicated; if replicated, it can be by
PB or SMR. In other words, surviving attacks and service
replication can be separated as distinct concerns and SMR
is not a pre-condition for attaining intrusion-resilience.
FORTRESS is a union of two ideas. It involves fortifying
servers with proxies which block direct server access, and
periodically randomizing the executables of proxies as well
as servers. Assuming that no server can be compromised
until at least one proxy is compromised, the following re-
sult was established in [7]: a fortified PB server is at least
as attack resilient as a 4-server SMR system; an attacker
who cannot intrude more than 1 server in the SMR system
cannot compromise the fortified PB server. The result also
assumes randomization only at system set-up and proactive
recovery as in [6], i.e., no periodic re-randomization. This
finding has significant implications: a fortified PB system
can have the same degree of resilience as an initially ran-
domized, periodically recovered, 1-tolerant SMR system.
We build on this finding in two ways.
Though the use of proxies in server systems is not new,
it is examined here in the context of randomization defence
and the benefits are highlighted (in section 2). Secondly,
we relax a central assumption in [7] and allow servers to be
compromised even when they are not directly accessible to
an attacker. We then compare, using both analytical models
and Monte-Carlo simulations, the resilience of FORTRESS
system against simple SMR and PB systems with either
proactive randomization or proactive recovery. We consider
a realistic range of randomization key entropies and a range
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of attacker strengths. Section 3 presents the FORTRESS
system with its PB servers. Sections 4 and 5 describe the
candidate systems, parameters considered and the evalua-
tion methods used in our comparative study whose results
are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background And Related Work
2.1 Attacks and Randomization Defences
Attacks launched for gaining intrusions typically exploit
programming and design errors in software running on tar-
get systems. (For other forms of ‘non-technological’ at-
tacks, see [5].) Code injection attacks exploit such an error
to achieve (1) injecting malicious code, and (2) changing
existing control information (e.g., return address) to have
the code executed. If the malicious code is executed, an in-
trusion occurs, and the attacker gains a greater control over
the system leaving the latter compromised. The vulnerabili-
ties that the attackers commonly exploit include: unchecked
buffer, double-freeing of freed or unallocated heap buffers
[2], integer overflow [15], and format-string errors.
To achieve step (2) above, the attacker must know the
critical address values; this is easy to determine once the
details of the operating system of the target system are fig-
ured out, given that the memory layout schemes of all major
operating systems are known or can be determined off-line.
Moreover, occasional use of an incorrect address value dur-
ing an attack merely causes crashing of the process serving
the attacker who is also a legitimate client. Usually, servers
have a forking daemon which forks a new (child) server pro-
cess if the working one crashes, assuming the causes under-
lying the crash to be benign. So, an attacker with less than
perfect knowledge on memory layout can still succeed so
long as the resulting crashes do not alert the administrator.
Address space randomization closes this loop-hole by
randomizing the default memory layout. Base addresses of
stack and heap in [1] or Global Offset Table in [13] are ran-
domized at runtime, and the random offset or key used is se-
curely stored and can be varied at re-boot. Critical addresses
therefore take their values at run time from a wide range of
possibilities, making it much harder to correctly determine
the exact values taken without committing too many mis-
takes. Address randomization also reduces the success rate
of return-to-libc attacks.
Other defensive techniques work to make the injection of
an executable code impossible/difficult. Notable ones are:
W⊕X pages, instruction set randomization and Heap ran-
domization [3]. However, these three techniques are easily
bypassed by return-to-libc attacks.
As pointed out in [5] and [8], these randomization tech-
niques offer not just efficient defences against intrusions
but also cost-effective means of injecting diversity within
a replicated system. Deploying varied hardware platforms,
different OS and application software with diverse design
and implementation is prohibitively expensive. Instead, ran-
domizing identical server replicas using different schemes
or different keys of the same scheme, leads to diverse ex-
ecutables that have a high degree of failure independence
against attacks - a key requirement for intrusion tolerance.
De-randomization attacks are the only known class of
attacks to have been tried against randomization defence.
They are deployed in [10] and [12] for studying the effec-
tiveness of ASLR and ISR, respectively. These attacks take
advantage of the fact that keys cannot be arbitrarily large.
In a 32-bit machine using the PaX system [1] only 16 bits
of entropy are available, so the random address offset is one
of 65536 possibilities.
A de-randomization attack is launched in two phases.
The first phase is devoted to determining the current ran-
domization key by probing for every possible key value. If
the value being probed is not the key, then the target process
will crash; otherwise, it will exhibit a specified behavior.
To complete phase-1, the attacker therefore requires (i)
a forking-server that keeps forking a new child whenever
the existing one crashes; and, (ii) a way of observing a pro-
cess crash in the remote target machine. In [10, 12], (i) is
assumed and (ii) comes in the form of the TCP connection
linking the attacker machine to the target: a process crash at
the target machine results in the closure of the TCP connec-
tion that the attacker has with the child server process.
The experiments in [10] and [12] confirm that the ran-
domization key used can be worked out within a finite time.
2.2 Role of Proxies
For a de-randomization attack to succeed, the attacker
must reliably observe a process crash on the target machine
and a direct TCP connection facilitates this in [10] and [12].
Moreover, the attacker should not be identified despite the
potentially large number of process crashes he may cause.
The authors of [10] point out two difficulties in suspect-
ing attacks at the server level. The attacker can pace his
probes so that the number of crashes he causes in a given
period does not exceed the threshold for raising suspicion.
Secondly, commercial enterprises deploy several servers for
load-balancing; probes launched at different times can be
processed by different servers; unless servers exchange ob-
servations on process crashes, the attacker evades suspicion
when the crashes are distributed across multiple servers.
A de-randomizing attacker is denied his advantages
when proxies hide servers from clients; they forward
clients’ requests to servers and server responses back to
clients. When an attacker launches an incorrectly guessed
probe, the proxy observes him as having submitted an in-
valid request; with replicated servers the observation is re-
peated. Since proxies do not do processing (unlike servers),
they can be used for logging their observations on client be-
havior for longer periods which can be used for identifying
sources suspected of launching de-randomization probes.
Proxies can thus reduce the success probability of de-
randomization attacks and hence play a major role in our
FORTRESS architecture [7]. Using proxies for enhancing
intrusion tolerance is not new. Saidane et al [9] use proxies
for hiding replication from clients, and also for detecting
server intrusions. The performance study in [9] indicates
that the overhead due to proxies is minimal when intrusions
are not suspected. It does not however measure resilience
gains attributable to proxies, which will be the focus here.
2.3 Proactive Obfuscation and Recovery
Re-randomization renders an attacker’s success in elim-
inating certain keys meaningless. It restores resiliency
against further attacks. However, it cannot be done on-
line and requires the files to be re-compiled, re-linked and
re-loaded. Hence, a re-boot is essential. Periodic re-
randomization is commonly referred to as proactive obfus-
cation [4, 8]. In this paper, the re-randomization period will
be referred to as the unit time-step.
The probability that a de-randomization attack succeeds
on a given machine within a unit time-step depends on the
number of probes (ω) that an attacker can complete within
the unit time-step and the number of keys (χ) available.
Roeder and Schneider [8] comprehensively investigate
applying proactive obfuscation to a state machine replicated
(SMR) server system. They identify the necessary mecha-
nisms and assumptions, build two prototypes and measure
throughput and latency. The main challenge lies in accom-
plishing proactive obfuscation without stopping the SMR
system itself, and it has been addressed as described below.
For the SMR system to be f–tolerant, it must have
n > 3f server replicas. At specific instances, a batch of
at most f replicas (logically) exit the SMR system to be
re-booted and re-randomized, and re-join the system after
having restored the service state and before the next batch
is to exit. There are thus at least dnf e state restorations per
unit time-step. Each one succeeds because n− f > 2f and
the re-joining replicas have at least (f +1) correct working
replicas to supply the correct service state.
Incorporating proactive obfuscation therefore requires
strict synchrony assumptions for timely exchange and
processing of state messages; also requires synchronized
clocks, secure components and timely links for timely start
and completion of batched re-randomization. Note that
these requirements are much stronger than the weakest en-
vironments in which SMR can be managed.
Proactive obfuscation is a more robust version of proac-
tive recovery [6] where the same software is re-installed
during periodic re-boot. A limited form of randomization
is possible in [11] where a replica chooses, during re-boot,
an executable from a small set of candidates.
3 Fortifying a Server System
In [7], we presented proactive fortification as a means of
incorporating attack resilience to any given server system;
the latter may or may not be replicated for fault-tolerance; if
replicated, any replication strategy can be used. The archi-
tecture is termed as FORTRESS and prescribes fortifying
a server system of ns servers using np redundant proxies.
As mentioned in 2.2, proxies act as intermediaries between
clients and the server system.
FORTRESS also prescribes that the ns server nodes are
uniquely indexed and the indices are known to servers and
proxies. Client can know proxies’ addresses and public
keys, servers’ indices (not addresses) and public-keys, the
type of replication, and the degree of fault-tolerance if repli-
cation is by SMR. This is facilitated through a trusted name-
server (NS) that is read-only for clients. (see [7] for details.)
Servers accept messages only from proxies and NS.
When the server tier is a fault-tolerant system, ns > 1.
Of interest here is that tier being a primary-backup repli-
cated system. Note that such a server system can tolerate
only node crashes, relies on failure independence and is not
inherently equipped to resist intrusive attacks. Below, the
interactions between clients and proxies, and between prox-
ies and primary-backup server are described.
Clients send their requests to all proxies and each proxy
submits the request to each server. The primary processes
each unique request and sends its response to all backup
servers. Each server signs the response together with its in-
dex and returns the signed response to every proxy. A proxy
over-signs any one of the authentic responses and forwards
the doubly-signed response to the client. A client accepts
a response as valid if it has two authentic signatures - one
from the proxy that sent the response and the other from one
of the servers. Note that proxies do not interact with each
other during client-server interactions.
FORTRESS prescription includes that the proxies and
server nodes are periodically re-randomized such that the
same key is used for servers which is distinct from the dif-
ferent keys used for randomizing proxies. Thus, at any time,
(np + 1) randomly-selected keys will be in use.
Servers are randomized identically so that regular state
updates of backup servers by the primary can be done war-
ranting no changes to an existing primary-backup system.
If randomized differently, state representations within each
server can be different (even though states are no differ-
ent); this means that marshalling and unmarshalling func-
tions would be needed to convert a server’s state represen-
tation to/from an abstract representation that is the same for
all servers. Since proxies do not interact with each other,
randomizing them differently incurs no overhead.
The fortified system fails against an attacker if he com-
promises one of the server replicas; we would expect the
attacker to target the primary server, which is readily iden-
tifiable as it is the one that executes requests from clients.
It is meaningful for an attacker to target only the primary
server for two reasons: (i) the primary server is readily iden-
tifiable as it has to send regular state updates to others; (ii)
a successful attack on the primary server compromises S1.
The fortified system is said to be compromised when an
attacker compromises either the primary or all np proxies.
As explained in 2.2, the presence of proxies makes
it harder for successful de-randomization attacks to be
launched when no proxy is compromised. An attacker’s
strategy may be to compromise one proxy and then use that
proxy to launch attacks on a server over a direct TCP con-
nection (as in [10, 12]). We note that proxies do not do any
processing, so compromising a proxy is harder than com-
promising a server that is directly accessed by the attacker.
4 Models of System and Attack
The systems considered for comparison are character-
ized here by the number of tiers they have and whether or
not re-randomization is used. The number of tiers can be ei-
ther 2 or 1 when the server tier is and is not fortified with a
proxy tier, respectively. While the server tier of a 2-tier sys-
tem implements only primary-backup replication, the 1-tier
server system can implement either one of the replication
types. Thus, three system classes are defined.
Definition 1 S0 is the 1-tier server system implementing
state machine replication.
S0 consists of 4 differently randomized nodes implementing
a service built as a DSM. Clients interact with these nodes
directly. The nodes execute an order protocol to decide on
the order for processing requests; correct nodes generate
identical responses for each request. S0 is compromised
as soon as more than one node is compromised.
Definition 2 S1 is the 1-tier server system implementing
primary-backup replication.
S1 consists of 3 nodes. Clients interact with all of these
nodes directly. The primary node processes client requests
and passes the state updates and the results to the backup
nodes. Should the primary node crash, it is detected and
one of the backup servers becomes the new primary.
As compromising the primary server is all that is
required for compromising S1, differently randomizing
servers does not add any extra resilience, but complicates
the state updating of backups by the primary. Therefore, it
will be assumed that the servers of S1, as in FORTRESS
servers and unlike in S0, are randomized identically.
Given that the servers of S1 are randomized identically
and the primary server is the only obvious target to attack,
it makes sense to regard compromising any one of them the
same as compromising the primary and hence S1 itself.
Definition 3 S2 is the 2-tier system where the server tier
implements primary-backup replication.
S2 complies with the FORTRESS architecture with ns =
np = 3. As in S1, we assume that compromising any
server replica is the same as compromising the primary.
Given that an attacker launches attacks simultaneously on
all proxies and servers, the compromise of S2 can happen
in three ways. Either the attacker manages to compromise
a server without having compromised any proxy, compro-
mises a proxy and uses it as a launch pad from which to
compromise a server, or compromises all proxies.
4.1 Modeling Obfuscation
Proactive obfuscation (PO), is modeled with two param-
eters: re-randomization period P , and the available diver-
sity (χ) determined by the entropy of randomization key.
We take P to be one unit time-step. Thus, in every unit time
step, every node is re-randomized if PO has been assumed.
The efficacy of PO depends on χ, the number of possi-
ble randomization keys. In practice, the randomization key
entropy appears to be 16 bits or 32 bits, and hence we con-
sider the case χ = 216 in this paper for evaluation.
We assume that re-randomization is completed instantly
at the end of each unit time-step. This simplifying assump-
tion is justified as we focus on the assessment of attack re-
siliency (and not on latency or throughput). So, proactive
obfuscation is modeled as randomly selecting fresh keys at
the end of each unit time step. Note that there is a non-zero
probability that a chosen key has been selected in earlier
time-steps. This probability gets smaller as χ gets larger.
Start-up only obfuscation represents the case where
nodes are only randomized initially. Subsequently, nodes
are simply recovered at the end of each unit time step. We
call this scheme start-up only obfuscation (SO). It can be
seen as proactive recovery [6] after an one-off initial ran-
domization (see also section 2.3). With SO, an attacker try-
ing to guess the randomization key is like sampling without
replacement, and the probability of making a correct guess
increases as more samples are completed.
However, with periodic re-randomization, i.e., with PO
where P = 1, guessing the randomization key in use is
like sampling with replacement. That is, the probability of
successfully guessing the key during a unit time-step is in-
dependent of guesses made during earlier time-steps.
4.2 Types of Attacks
Attacks can be of two classes, depending on whether the
attacker interacts directly with the target. If that is the case,
it is called a direct attack; if the attacker cannot directly
interact with the target and dispatches the attack to the target
through another machine, then the attack is called indirect.
Attacks on servers in S0 and S1 systems (also in [10, 12])
are direct attacks. In S2, direct attacks target proxies while
the indirect ones target servers and are dispatched through
proxies; an attacker can simultaneously launch direct at-
tacks against proxies and indirect ones against servers.
Once a direct/indirect attack against a given node suc-
ceeds, we assume that the attacker compromises that node
and continues to control it until re-randomization is applied.
Definition 4 The probability that a direct attack on a proxy
or server node launched in the ith time-step succeeds is αi.
The probability αi depends on three key variables: χ (the
number of keys available for randomization), ω (the number
of probes an attacker can launch in a unit time-step), and
whether randomization is PO or SO.
Indirect attacks are launched against the servers of a 2-
tier S2 system through the proxies.
We have noted earlier (in 2.2) that when a proxy handles
an incorrectly guessed probe, it observes the client having
submitted an invalid request; by logging these observations
for several time-steps, and analyzing the frequency of such
occurrences from a given source, it can fairly accurately de-
duce whether the client is acting with malicious purposes.
Given this possibility, the attacker is forced to opt for a
smaller ω to evade detection; this means that the presence
of proxies effectively reduces ω of an attacker. That is, for a
given attacker, his indirect attacks tend to have lower prob-
ability of success compared with his direct attacks. This is
modeled using the indirect attack coefficient, denoted as κ.
Definition 5 The probability that an indirect attack
launched in the ith time-step succeeds is κ × αi, and κ,
0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 is the indirect attack coefficient.
Note that κ is independent of the number of proxies de-
ployed. Also αi is independent of i for PO systems;
α = αi, ∀i ≥ 1. For SO systems, α = α1 and we derive αi,
i ≥ 2, from αi−1 assuming that χ is large compared to ω.
Note that αi decreases as i increases in the SO case; attacks
on such a system are like sampling without replacement.
Definition 6 The probability that a direct attack succeeds
on a node during a unit time-step that begins immediately
after that node has been (re-)randomized, is denoted as α.
5 Evaluation Methods
The evaluations presented in this paper assume that time
progresses in unit time steps, starting at time T0 when all
nodes are assumed to be correct.
Definition 7 The expected lifetime (EL) of a system is the
expected number of whole unit time steps that elapse until
the system is compromised. We say that system A outlives
system B if EL of A is larger than EL of B. It is denoted
as A → B. A c−→ B implies that A → B holds under
condition c.
Finally, we use either Absorbing Markov Chain methods
(where state spaces are sufficiently small) or Monte-Carlo
simulations to determine the EL until system compromise.
In our assessment, we consider the range of α values
from 0.00001 to 0.01 as a realistic range. This range covers
a variety of α values where at least one of the systems has
large enough EL to be a useful real system.
6 Results
The expected lifetimes (EL) for various systems are pre-
sented in figures 1 and 2, showing four key trends.
S1SO outlives S0SO: This result is significant as SMR
with proactive recovery is widely perceived to be an impor-
tant method for achieving intrusion-tolerance [6], [11]. The
explanations are 2-fold.
First, randomization is done only at start-up; so, every
unsuccessful de-randomization probe continues to elimi-
nate one key from χ possible ones. In S0, each of the four
nodes is randomized once using a distinct key. The proba-
bility that the ith probe, i ≥ 1 launched uncovers any one of
these 4 keys, assuming none has been uncovered so far, is
4
χ−i . Similarly, the probability that the ith probe i ≥ 1 un-
covers the second key, assuming that only one key has been
uncovered so far, is 3
χ−i . Compromise of S0 happens when
the latter event occurs. In S1, all nodes are identically ran-
domized using a single, randomly chosen key; once that key
used is uncovered, S1 is compromised. Hence, the proba-
bility that the ith probe compromises S1 is 1χ−i , which is at
least three times smaller. Thus, when probes are crafted as
service requests and when all other factors remain the same,
S1 is likely to be compromised later than S0.
Secondly, real diversity is not being considered, only ar-
tificial diversity through randomization. With the former, a
vulnerability is unlikely in all replicas; whereas, here, repli-
cas may share the same vulnerable bug; if so, only the de-
fense they have against that bug being exploited are diverse.
S2PO and S1PO outlive all SO Systems: This sug-
gests that proactive obfuscation is a more effective tech-
nique for intrusion tolerance than either SMR or proactive
recovery.
Figure 1. Expected Lifetime Comparison
Figure 2. Expected Lifetimes of the S2PO
Systems as κ varies (logarithmic scale)
S2PO outlives S1PO when κ ≤ 0.9: As long as prox-
ies causes difficulty to an attacker in launching successful
indirect attacks, the FORTRESS system is superior to im-
plementing proactive obfuscation directly on a PB system.
S0PO outlives S2PO except when κ = 0: This sug-
gests that unless proxies can completely prevent indirect at-
tacks, an SMR system using proactive obfuscation is the
most effective of all systems considered.
In summary,
S0PO
κ>0−−−→ S2PO κ≤0.9−−−−→ S1PO → S1SO → S0SO
7 Conclusions
The resilience assessment carried out here helps us make
a design choice between SMR and FORTRESS approaches.
If compliance to deterministic state machine (DSM) is eas-
ily achievable or already available, then SMR with proactive
obfuscation is recommended. The least effective way for-
ward appears to be SMR with proactive recovery, given that
the infrastructure support for recovery is substantial and can
be extended for obfuscation (see [8], [11] and [6]). If DSM
compliance is costly or not feasible, then primary backup
replication with FORTRESS is readily recommended. De-
tailed comparison of FORTRESS with SMR that is fire-
walled for confidentiality reasons [14] will be a future work.
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